

- Although we often see opposition to climate change as a willful refusal to acknowledge facts, recent transformations in public attitudes toward facts and authority encourage us to confuse reasonable and unreasonable doubts. That confusion makes it difficult—not just for climate skeptics—to accept many public claims of fact.
- Although we usually see the climate change debate as a perversion of proper argumentation, it actually proceeds as argumentation typically does. Rather than arguing to correct error, all of us typically argue to preserve our intuitions. That allows basic human frailties, such as motivated reasoning and confirmation bias, to interfere with our judgments.
- Although we usually see the climate change debate as a competition between political and economic interests, the divide between pro and con—which is to say left and right—is much deeper. In the United States and in much of the West, we are self-sorted into opposing ideological camps. These camps adhere to deeply held moral foundations, which are evident in predominant conceptual metaphors and metonymies, including the key figures that shape people's attitudes toward the Earth itself.
- Changes in the way we communicate—driven partly by technology and driven partly by a new emphasis on visual communication—make attention rather than truth the commodity that is most desired. And in the course of vying for attention, all of the factors that tend to undermine rational deliberation are amplified.

Any one of these factors might by itself make the climate change debate difficult. But taken together, they create a situation that makes the worst of argumentation not only possible but likely.

The fact is, the current argumentative situation is not very encouraging. But it's not yet time to give up hope. In the end, I will offer some suggestions about how we ought to argue when "winning" matters. I do not insist that my suggestions are the only possible ones. However, I do insist that we need to think anew about what we expect from arguments about climate change and how we should undertake them.

Works cited

- Bazerman, Charles. *Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science*. Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin, 1988. Print.
- ✓ Ceccarelli, Leah. "Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science, Rhetoric, and Public Debate." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 14.2 (2011): 195–228. Print.
- . *Shaping Science with Rhetoric: The Cases of Dobzhansky, Schrödinger, and Wilson*. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2001. Print.
- Fahnestock, Jeanne. *Rhetorical Figures in Science*. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.
- Knorr-Cetina, Karin. *The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981. Print.
- Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979. Print.
- Myers, Greg. *Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge*. Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin P, 1990. Print.

1 What if we're wrong about what's wrong with argument?

The climate change debate is often quite sharp and quite basic. The "sides" cannot even agree on what kind of argument to have or whether to have one at all. Secretary of State John Kerry says unequivocally: "We should not allow a tiny minority of shoddy scientists and science and extreme ideologues to compete with scientific fact. ... [W]e don't have time for a meeting anywhere of the Flat Earth Society." Contrast that with a remark from longtime conservative commentator and self-proclaimed denier, George Will: "When a politician on a subject implicating science ... says 'the debate is over,' you may be sure of two things: The debate is raging, and he's losing it." Kerry and Will are hardly outliers. They express as well as anyone the hardened attitudes of the most important voices in the debate.

It is no coincidence, either, that both Kerry and Will take part in other polarized controversies. The argument that rages about global warming is not hermetically sealed. It is part of a larger public discourse in the United States and beyond. Nearly everyone agrees: Public argumentation is in crisis today. We're offended by its hostility, its unfairness, its frequent disregard of facts. And we worry about it. Unproductive argumentation hurts people in tangible ways.

Disheartening examples are easy to find. Just think of arguments about virtually any public disagreement—reproductive rights, same-sex marriage, gun safety, tax fairness. Yet even in this atmosphere of animosity and insult, the discourse surrounding climate change is especially confounding. What would seem to be a purely scientific question has become a focus of not just scientific disagreement but of every kind of disagreement.

On the web, the situation looks especially fraught. Consider this (not particularly egregious) thread from *City-Data.com*:¹

Rikoshaprl

Obama, Reid and all the other fake filibustering, radical, left wing democrats state global warming is "settled science." They are full of hot air. Has any MSM [Mainstream Media] network aired the fact that 31,000 scientists have signed a petition stating they believe there is no man made global warming and that greenhouse gases are actually beneficial to the Earth? Over 9,000

of these scientists have PHD's. The Petition Project has been going on since 2009 yet it receives no attention from the global warming kooks.

Seabass Inna Bun

That's because it's garbage that came and went 16 years ago. Quote [from an earlier thread]: "What the 'petition' does in fact have is (approximately) 31,072 largely unverifiable signatures on slips of paper which um ... isn't really exactly the same thing. Hmmm, a petition of scientists of questionable repute to challenge a mainstream scientific view using a failed argument from authority—there's a new one!"

.....

The *Seattle Times* reported that it includes names such as: "Perry S. Mason" (the fictitious lawyer), "Michael J. Fox" (the actor), "Robert C. Byrd" (the Senator), "John C. Grisham" (the lawyer-author), not to mention a Spice Girl, a.k.a. Geraldine Halliwell: the petition listed "Dr. Geri Halliwell" and "Dr. Halliwell."

.....

Notwithstanding its rather dubious methodology and fake names, that bastion of scientific rigor, Fox News, has quoted the petition in its news stories.

.....

TrapperJohn

Burn 'em at the stake! In case anyone wonders, this project isn't funded by the Evil Koch Brothers, Big Oil, or any others. It's funded only by donations from the scientists who sign the petition, and the funding primarily is used for postage and similar.

.....

SourD, responding to Seabass Inna Bun

You just can't wait for us to be taxed for CO₂ can you? Tell us, how does paying to produce CO₂ eliminate it?

.....

Don Draper

The guy who started the petition was paid by Petroleum and tobacco companies. Money talks bs walks.

.....

Seabass Inna Bun, responding to SourD

I couldn't care less about you or your taxes. I'm just proving right-wing denialists are liars. ("31,000 Scientists")

If John Kerry and George Will provide us with an example of highbrow polarization, the contributors to this thread show us the grassroots hostility that lurks not far beneath the surface of much public discourse about climate change.

It is fair to observe, of course, that even in this blunt web debate, all involved are ostensibly concerned with facts and their credibility. Rikoshaprl wants climate change believers to pay attention to a petition with 30,000 signatures of scientists. If genuine, that petition would seem to be worth more than a moment's notice. But Seabass Inna Bun doubts the petition's authenticity and supports his rebuttal by referring to the *Seattle Times*. He also injects some analysis of argumentative technique, citing "argument from authority."² Others plainly realize that the petition may be suspect because of its political provenance. That's why TrapperJohn preempts a likely accusation by saying that the petition was funded by the people who signed it and not by the Koch brothers. In turn, that claim is disputed by Don Draper.

It sounds almost like a genuine debate. However, the exchange of gotchas is beside the point. The real point seems to be mutual contempt. Rikoshaprl scorns "fake filibustering, radical, left wing democrats," who are "global warming kooks." Seabass Inna Bun sarcastically calls Fox News "that bastion of scientific rigor." SourD says derisively that Seabass Inna Bun "can't wait to be taxed." Don Draper calls denialist claims "bs." Seabass Inna Bun calls denialists "liars."

The exchange of comments is less a debate than an excuse to trade insults. It is not different in character and method from the climate change debate at large, or, indeed, from many contentious debates that characterize current public discourse.

A litany of complaints about the way we argue

My aim in this book is not chiefly to complain about the contentiousness of arguments about climate change. Indeed, what I hope to show is that the argumentative situation is affected by numerous factors that are both less noticeable and more damaging than its all-too-evident hostility suggests. But that hostility is, nonetheless, an important force in the argumentative situation. So it's only right to acknowledge what scholars, journalists, and politicians have come to lament with depressing regularity—it's real.

In fact, the sorry state of public argumentation has been evident for a long time. Let me comment briefly about three aspects of the problem that seem to gain the most notice.

1. Public arguments are about winning and little else.

Many observe that our politicians, activists, and partisan commentators would rather win than be right. Today, argumentative victory is not just an important goal; it eclipses all other goals. That win-at-all-costs argumentation is so dominant that it is hard to find other models. Something must be done.

Anxiety about all of this certainly shapes contemporary teaching of writing and rhetoric. Textbooks are honor-bound to disabuse students of the idea that "winning" is the only aim of argumentation. On the very first page of *The Structure of Argument*, Annette Rottenberg and Donna Haisty Winchell say, "Of course, not all arguments end in clear victories for one side or another. Nor should they" (3). In the opening pages of *They Say/I Say*, Graff and Birkenstein write, "Although argumentation is often associated with conflict and opposition, the type of conversational 'they say/I say' arguments that we focus on in this book can be just as useful when you agree as when you disagree" (8). Such cautions ring true. In fact, obviously true. Argumentation does not have to be a contest where my gain is your loss.

Yet the idea of noncompetitive or cooperative argumentation runs counter to deeply held cultural habits, which can be hard to accept. Consider this version of the standard warning. In *Everything's An Argument*, Lunsford, Ruskiewicz, and Walters tell students that the Western concept of argument is usually "about disputation or combat," but "writers and speakers have as many purposes for arguing as for using language, including—in addition to winning—to inform, to explore, to make decisions, and even to meditate or pray" (5). I must admit that although I understand perfectly well what Lunsford *et al.* are saying, it takes some effort for me to make complete sense of it.

Perhaps I am not as good a person as I should be, but I ask myself these honest questions about why I argue: Do I really argue just in order to inform? Or is it to inform others about an idea that I favor? Do I really argue in order to explore? Or to explain the insights I've gained from my explorations? Do I really argue in order to make decisions? Or to recommend what I think is the best decision?

Then, I arrive at "to meditate or pray." If I think for a moment, I can imagine scenarios in which meditation or prayer do involve argumentation. I suppose that in those cases, I might argue with myself. But isn't meditation as much about *not* thinking as about thinking? Isn't prayer about praising, thanking, and asking? Where are the claims? Where are the reasons and evidence that support those claims?

To think of meditation or prayer as arguing requires a profound broadening of what counts as an argument. Lunsford *et al.* say that "everything" is an argument. However, it is one thing to recognize that a broader conception of argumentation may well be useful, and another for us to see it everywhere we look. Yet when we toss aside the Western default—arguing a point, arguing competitively—it can be difficult to say what is *not* an argument.

Some have pointed out how easy it is for textbooks and teachers to fall into old habits, despite the earnestness of their cautions. A. Abby Knoblauch writes:

As we have seen, both *Writing Arguments* and *Everything's an Argument* initially define argument as more than attempts at winning or conversion, but the discussion questions, examples, and more detailed explications within both textbooks privilege an intent to persuade, illustrating for students the primacy of persuasion and either marginalizing or functionally erasing alternative processes or outcomes. (262)

Along the same lines, Chris Blankenship traces the patterned ways that textbooks warn first about the competitive impulse and then slip back into the frame of competitive or adversarial argumentation. This apparent inconsistency doesn't make a broader, more cooperative view of argumentation any less valuable. It simply demonstrates how deeply entrenched in our cultural habits the win-lose view of argumentation is.

One reason for its staying power is that well-established conceptual metaphors undergird our ideas about argumentation. These metaphors tell us, as Lakoff and Johnson point out, that arguing is systematically conflictual. In ordinary talk, we say that people *win*, *lose*, *overcome*, *strengthen*, *weaken*, and *defend* arguments. Even seemingly non-competitive metaphors can be tricky. We *build* arguments. But whatever is *built* can be *destroyed* by counterarguments. If our arguments *go in circles* or if our arguments *have holes in them*, we can *lose*. All of these expressions add up to a metaphor system that sets the parameters for thinking about argumentation. Call the main metaphor in the system Argument Is War, as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson do (3–4). Call it Argument Is Conflict. But whatever we call it, it is the frame that alternative ideas about arguing are up against.

The desire to set that frame aside comes partly, I think, from simple distaste. Especially in our current media environment, competitive arguing can be ugly. Yet there are other good reasons for rejecting the win-lose model of argument. Sharon Crowley makes this point well:

Arguments can't be "won" in the way that basketball teams win. ... If I succeed in persuading you to change your mind about the injustice of preemptive war, for example, I have not "won" much of anything except your (perhaps temporary and lukewarm) adherence to this position. And by entering into argument with you, I put my own position at risk; during argument you may in fact convince me that in this or that particular case of preemptive war was just, in which case I must qualify my original claim. You can read this as a "win" if our relationship is competitive for some reason, and I suppose in this circumstance "victory" in an argument

provides satisfaction similar to that achieved when, for example, the Phoenix Mercury finally wins a game. That is to say, just as we may extrapolate from "My team beats yours" to "My team is better than yours," we may extrapolate from "You accepted my claim" to "I am smarter than you." (33)

It is true, when we look closely at the world of argumentation, it is difficult to know who has won and who has lost. The more honest the participants, the less clear that division becomes.

2. Public arguments are presented as two-sided even when they do not need to be.

The metaphor Argument Is War is expressed in many ways, but all of those expressions conform to the same conceptual shape. It rests on a stable image-schema. If someone can *win* an argument, it follows that someone else has to *lose*. So the image-schema entails two contending sides, one combatant against another.

As complex as wars may actually be, with multiple aims and numerous combatants, we often reduce them to two sides—the Allies versus the Axis Powers, the terrorists against the civilized world. So it is with arguments. When we think of argument as war, the metaphor has a simplifying effect. Argument becomes a matter of claims and counterclaims, pro and con, convinced or not convinced, true or false. It becomes a matter of taking sides.

In political argumentation, this phenomenon is called polarization. Floyd Anderson and Andrew King's 1971 study of President Nixon's "silent majority" is often called a seminal statement on the rhetoric of polarization. They define polarization as a process by which "an extremely diversified public is coalesced into two or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity" (244). Which is to say: polarization is not just about having opposing opinions. It is also, or mostly, about being different kinds of people.

Not surprisingly, the war metaphor appears in King and Anderson's description. Polarization does its work by creating a "we feeling" that requires "a perceived 'common foe' which the group must oppose if it is to preserve the fabric of [its] beliefs" (244). Nixon created the "silent majority" as a foil to the anti-Vietnam War demonstrators. It was an either/or proposition. Those who were not part of the "silent majority" were part of the "radical left." In Nixon's rhetoric, the "radical left" lumped together violent demonstrators with, for example, members of the U.S. Senate who opposed the war. Us versus them.

The issues have changed today, but it doesn't take much imagination to see how polarization continues to work in the same way. Yet if polarized argumentation in the past couple of decades is not so different in kind, it is different in

breadth. Virtually all public argumentation is peopled by ever-warring groups. It has become almost impossible for us to imagine an argument that isn't composed of two irreconcilable sides.

No one explains the problem more cogently than Deborah Tannen in *The Argument Culture: Stopping America's War of Words*. She questions "the ubiquity, the knee-jerk nature, of approaching almost any issue, problem, or public person in an adversarial way" (8). In her role as a public intellectual, Tannen knows very well how public discussion constantly takes the form of war-like argumentation. She tells of the time she chatted amiably with a fellow guest before a radio appearance, only to be aggressively attacked by him on the air because, as he explained to her, such behavior is expected.

Her greatest lament is that such experiences are not limited to media appearances. She describes a panel at the Smithsonian Institution titled (without her prior knowledge) "The War of the Sexes." And when she participated in a discussion with an African-American playwright at a local theater, the flyer—to Tannen's and the playwright's chagrin—promised a conversation about the conflicts between Blacks and Jews (6–7).

Tannen doesn't claim that all conflict needs to be removed from argument at all times (few do), but she does worry about the consequences of this persistent emphasis on taking sides. When you take sides in an argument, she observes, argumentation can fail us: "Opposition does not lead to truth when an issue is not composed of two opposing sides but is a crystal of many sides. Often the truth is in the complex middle, not the oversimplified extremes" (11).

3. Two-sided, winner-take-all argumentation has poisoned the public square.

We cannot discuss argumentation without mentioning the discouraging state of U.S. politics and governance. It would be like discussing the Titanic and leaving out the iceberg. The truth is, it's difficult to tell whether argumentation has become hyper-contentious because of the political environment or the other way around. But most observers agree: To fix one, you have to fix the other.

That is certainly the view expressed by Al Gore (*Assault*), who believes, along with many others, that something has gone "terribly wrong" with our democracy (introduction). He bemoans a public discourse filled with "the rejection and distortion of science" (introduction), "the language and politics of fear that short-circuit debate and drive the public agenda without regard to the evidence, the facts, or the public interest" (ch. 1), and a world of communication in which "an incestuous coupling of power and money" has led to "the misuse of public power" (ch. 3).

The root of the problem, says Gore, is the way we receive information and the limited means citizens have for responding to it. Because of mass communication,

especially television, citizens no longer participate in the "marketplace of ideas," which began in the Enlightenment and came into full flower in the world's great democracies, not least in the United States. And the main aim of the marketplace of ideas has been abandoned—the obligation to seek agreement.

For Gore, writing in 2007, the Internet provides the best hope for restoring a genuinely "connected" populace. Since then, the Internet has become increasingly interactive. Blogging and social media have proliferated. Nevertheless, observers of public argumentation still despair. In the U.S., we seem to be mired in a public discourse that privileges image over substance, emphasizes controversy no matter how much common ground may actually exist, and adheres to a false "balancing" of viewpoints that allows mis- and disinformation to flourish.

Let me pause here to give the idea of "balance" special attention. It is especially pernicious. I feel its insidious pressure every time I write. I felt it, in particular, while composing the preceding three paragraphs about Al Gore.

I think that Al Gore sees rather clearly much of what is wrong with our public discourse. He is right that it is often filled with false and misleading information. I think he is right that democracy cannot function well without an informed, connected public—a "meritocracy of ideas" (ch. 3). Yet I feel uneasy citing him as an authority. I am painfully aware that Gore—former Vice President of the United States, two-time presidential candidate, and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize—is a dicey authority to cite. In our polarized discursive landscape, he is as much reviled as revered.

And so I feel an urge to seek a balance—perhaps to cite a conservative voice who agrees with Gore. In our current argumentative situation, can anything be called "true" until the two warring sides both admit that it is correct? Short of that, I feel the urge to put forward equal and opposite complaints from a movement conservative about bias in the mainstream media. Should I do that despite my deep reservations about those accusations?

You see the dilemma. It is difficult to talk about our dispiriting argumentative situation without some temptation—in the name of fairness—to contribute to it.

Indeed, as the balancing game is played today, it won't be enough for me to cite, as I am about to do, a book called *It's Even Worse Than It Looks* co-authored by Thomas Mann, who hails from the "liberal" Brookings Institute, and Norm Ornstein, who hails from the "conservative" American Enterprise Institute. In their recent analysis of political extremism in U.S. discourse and governance, they dispute the notion that both "sides" are equally responsible for the problem.

They call it "asymmetric polarization" and place the blame squarely on the conservatives. "It is traditional," they write, "that those in the American media intent on showing their lack of bias frequently report to their viewers and readers that both sides are equally guilty of partisan misbehavior [but] the reality is very different" (51). They document the Republicans' sharp turn to the right and, in turn, blame them and their ultra-conservative allies for poisoning the public square.

Like Tannen, they point to the reflexive two-sides-to-everything model followed by the media. They write:

The Fox business model is based on maintaining a loyal audience of conservatives ... MSNBC has adopted the Fox Model on the left, in milder form ... [and] CNN ... has settled on having regular showdowns pitting either a bedrock liberal against a bedrock conservative or a reliable spinner for Democrats against a Republican counterpart. (60)

That model, of course, reinforces the Argument Is War metaphor, and not only in the sense that all arguments must have two sides, but also in the sense that each side must be bent on the other's destruction. It's not enough for one of these sides to win. The other must lose.

Worse yet, it's not a fair fight. It is conceivable that a two-sides model could operate without so much vitriol. But the Republican Party, Mann and Ornstein say,

has become an insurgent outlier—ideologically extreme, contemptuous of the social and economic regime; scornful of compromise; unpersuaded by conventional understanding of facts, evidence, and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition. (xiv)

That extremism contributes to a media environment in which "no lie is too extreme to be published, aired, and repeated, with little or no repercussion for its perpetrator" (61).

The problem extends, perhaps to Al Gore's chagrin, into cyberspace. Mann and Ornstein write of false political anecdotes that "in their modern, Internet-driven form ... share an unexpected trait: Most of the time, Democrats (or liberals) are the ones under attack" (66). Although some Internet mischief has been aimed at conservatives, "when it comes to generating and sustaining specious and shocking stories, there's no contest" (66). The award goes to conservatives and Republicans.

Mann and Ornstein make a good case. Yet I am uneasy about taking that harsh condemnation as my starting point—even if the evidence for it is strong, even if it aligns with my own observations. I can't help it. I ask myself: Isn't there some way for me to be fair and balanced?

A prayer is not an argument

If observers are right about the state of public argumentation, there seems to be very little we can do about it—short of somehow returning, as Al Gore suggests, to a meritocratic marketplace of ideas in which sound arguments prevail in the

end. Which is to say: We need to become better people and, even more daunting, to convince our opponents to become better people too.

At this historical moment, that kind of solution seems to me inadequate or, at least, out of reach. The argumentative situation appears to be intractable. We do suffer from an argue-to-win cultural model, we do divide most public arguments into two combating sides, the public square is poisoned, and one side does offend more than the other.

One way to address the problem might be to abandon argumentation altogether, as one delegate did at the 2012 United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Doha, Qatar. The delegate was Naderev Sano from the Philippines. He had evidently lost all faith in the power of reason alone. In the aftermath of a devastating storm in his country, which was double the size of the one that devastated the East Coast of the United States in 2012, he delivered a desperate plea.

I heard it on the radio and was riveted by Sano's inability to contain his emotion. He begins with a dignity that befits the occasion:

An important backdrop for my delegation is the profound impacts of climate change that we are already confronting. And as we see here, every single hour, even as we vacillate and procrastinate here, we are suffering. Madam Chair, we have never had a typhoon like Bopha, which has wreaked havoc in a part of the country that has never seen a storm like this in half a century.

Soon, his dignified tone begins to crumble. You begin to hear his voice waver:

Finally, Madam Chair, I'm making an urgent appeal, not as a negotiator, not as a leader of my delegation, but as a Filipino. I appeal to the whole world. I appeal to the leaders from all over the world to open our eyes ...

As he finishes his plea, he struggles to maintain his composure, but you can hear that he is crying:

... to the stark reality that we face. I appeal to ministers.

The outcome of our work is not about what our political masters want. It is about what is demanded of us by seven billion people. I appeal to all—please, no more delays. No more excuses. Please, let Doha be remembered as the place where we found the political will to turn things around. ("This Week")

Some might see this as an argument of sorts. However, it is not an argument that invites discussion—not the kind that asks its audience to weigh evidence or to reason carefully. Sano's message is not "consider my claim and act accordingly"; it is "please help us."

Desperate pleas have a time and place. We often turn to prayers and supplications when rational argument has failed. I am entirely sympathetic to Mr. Sano. However, I do not think it is time to give up on argument. In fact, I fear that those who are deaf to persuasive arguments are equally deaf to emotional pleas.

5! ★

Notes

- 1 I've edited for brevity but not for standard punctuation and spelling.
- 2 I realize that Seabass Inna Bun could be female. In fact, I can't be certain of the gender of any of the contributors to this exchange.

Works cited

- "31,000 Scientists Believe There Is No Man Made Global Warming." Thread. City-data.com. March 14, 2014. Web. 15 March 2014.
- Blankenship, Chris. *Metaphors of Argumentation in First-Year Writing Classes*. Northern Illinois University, 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan, 2012. Print.
- Crowley, Sharon. *Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism*. Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh, 2006. Print.
- Gore, Albert. *The Assault on Reason*. New York: Penguin, 2007. iBook file.
- Graff, Gerald, and Cathy Birkenstein. *They Say/I Say: The Moves That Matter in Academic Writing*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2010. Print.
- King, Andrew A., and Floyd Douglas Anderson. "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority': A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Polarization." *Western Speech* 35.4 (1971): 243–55. Print.
- Kerry, John. "Remarks on Climate Change," Department of State. 16 Feb. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2014.
- Knoblauch, A. Abby. "A Textbook Argument: Definitions of Argument in Leading Composition Textbooks." *College Composition and Communication* 63.2 (2011): 244–68. Print.
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. *Metaphors We Live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Print.
- Lunsford, Andrea A., John J. Ruskiewicz, and Keith Walters. *Everything's an Argument: With Readings*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007. Print.
- Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. *It's Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism*. New York: Basic, 2012. Kindle file.
- Rottenberg, Annette T and Donna Haisty Winchell. *The Structure of Argument, Eighth Edition*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2011.
- Tannen, Deborah. *The Argument Culture: Stopping America's War of Words*. New York: Ballantine, 1999. Print.
- "This Week." *This American Life*. NPR. 7 December 2011. Radio.
- Will, George. *Fox News Sunday*. February 15, 2014. Television.